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Abstract
Whats the role of unilateral measures in global climate change mitigation in a
post-Durban, post 2012 global policy regime? We argue that under conditions of
preference heterogeneity, unilateral emissions mitigation at a subnational level may
exist even when a nation is unwilling to commit to emission cuts. As the fraction of
individuals unilaterally cutting emissions in a global strongly connected network of
countries evolves over time, learning the costs of cutting emissions can result in the
adoption of such activities globally and we establish that this will indeed happen
under certain assumptions. We analyze the features of a policy proposal that could
accelerate convergence to a low carbon world in the presence of global learning.
JEL Classication: Q54, F53, Q55, O33.
We would like to thank participants ESRC funded Climate Change Workshops at Warwick (2009,
2010) and the CCCP-CAGE workshop "The Global Development Post-Durban Of Policy Regimes To
Combat Climate Change" (March 2012) and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The
third and the fourth authors acknowledge the support of the Ontario Research Fund. A companion
paper "Unilateral measures and emissions mitigation" (2012) has a greater focus on documentation and
policy while this paper focuses on the theoretical modelling of unilateral emissions mitigation and learn-
ing. E-mail addresses: shurojitc@smu.edu.sg; Sayantan.Ghosal@glasgow.ac.uk; swalsh999@hotmail.ca;
jwhalley@uwo.ca.
1
Keywords: Unilateral initiatives, mitigation, spillovers, global learning, technol-
ogy transfer.
2
1 Introduction
The Copenhagen Accords1, while non-binding, sets out the foundations of a framework
for the unilateral actions of all the parties relating to mitigation and adaptation activities.
Under what conditions do such unilateral measures also provide an adequate foundation
for global climate change mitigation building on cross-country spillovers and learning?2
Evidently individuals within countries will, at any point in time, compare the benets and
costs of cutting emissions unilaterally; however, the pattern of cross-country spillovers (the
structure of connections between countries in a global network), underpinned by appro-
priate policy mechanisms, will also inuence how learning takes place and the outcome to
which such learning converges. Beyond Copenhagen, in the presence of a post-Durban,
post 2012 global policy regime with a seemingly limited multilateral process this may o¤er
a constructive avenue for progress.
We note that participation and compliance in a broad-based multilateral initiative
1The text that came out of the Copenhagen meeting hosted by the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 2009 is referred to as the Copenhagen Accords.
2An earlier literature on learning and climate change, in contrast to the approach adopted here, focuses
on the role of uncertainity of climate damage and learning by delaying action. See Kolstad (1996),Ulph
and Ulph (1997) and ONeil et al (2006). The analysis contained in Barreto and Kypreos (2004) is the
closest to our focus here.
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that aims to go further than what individual countries are unilaterally willing to commit
has been hard to achieve under UNFCCC process. Any broad based global cooperation
that requires nations to commit to emission cuts beyond what nations are unilaterally
willing to undertake is unlikely to be stable (i.e. immune to deviations by a nation or a
coalition of nations).3
Why would individual agents undertake unilateral emission cuts within a country even
in the absence of a global agreement to cut emissions? This could happen because it is in
the self-interest of relevant economic actors (e.g. adaptation to the local impacts of climate
change) to undertake unilateral measures that also result lower emissions. Nevertheless,
the diversity of unilateral initiatives reects a underlying heterogeneity of interests, beliefs,
motivation at the level of countries, regions and groups (e.g. signalling certain forms of
self-enforcing collective identity (Olson (1971)) or just a "warm glow" (Andreoni (2006)).
The cost of cutting emissions could limit, at any one point of time, the size of the group of
3By delaying participation or by not complying with a global agreement to cut emissions, a deviating
country or a coalition of such countries can continue to capture the short-term benets from continuing
with high carbon economic activities, but pass a signicant portion of the costs to others (other countries,
future generations): Free riding in the presence of negative externalities limits the scope for cooperation
in the presence of weak property rights. Shapley and Shubik (1969) and Starrett (1973) were among the
rst to make this point.
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individuals, within a given country, who would be willing to unilaterally undertake costly
emissions cuts. As a consequence, although a national level commitment to emission cuts
may not emerge as the outcome of majority voting, unilateral measures may then exist
at various subnational levels.
This paper studies the possible interplay between unilateral measures and global cli-
mate change mitigation aiming to build on the initiative from Copenhagen. Our starting
point is the observation that although national level commitments to unilateral emis-
sion cuts have been hard to achieve, there is a variety of existing unilateral measures
to cut emissions already underway. In a companion paper (Chatterji, Ghosal, Whalley
and Walsh (2012)), we document the extent, form and variety, some at a national level
but mainly at a subnational (regional/urban/individual) level, of existing unilateral mea-
sures. Examples of such unilateral measures include community based programs such as
free bicycle plans, as in Copenhagen, Denmark, or watershed renewal programmes, such
as in rural communities bordering major rain forests as in Mexico. As such most unilat-
eral measures consist of a mix of local adaptation together with increasing capacity in
renewables and a reduction of energy consumption either directly and indirectly (via en-
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ergy saving techniques, infrastructure renewal and increased e¢ ciency). The objectives of
such measures are typically more heavily focused on reduced energy consumption (which
implies reduced emissions) rather than directly on emission mitigation.
Switching to low carbon activities requires the di¤usion of low carbon technologies
primarily in key sectors such as energy, infrastructure, transport and industry. The use
of these technologies in one nation, or a region/city within a nation will generate positive
transnational spillovers (Human Development Report (2008)). When a small group of
cities unilaterally introduces measures to induce more use of public transport it also lowers
the cost of adopting such a policy in other cities elsewhere in the world and therefore
initiates a learning process that could lead to a greater use of public transport globally in
urban areas. At a national level, reducing the cost of generating electricity by wind/solar
power potentially benets economic actors in other countries and not just within the
borders of the country where the innovation takes place.
A case in point is the argument that the initial commitment to cut 50% of CFCs in
the Montreal protocol was critical to its success as it lowered the costs of making even
bigger reductions by providing a real incentive for the development of substitutes to CFCs
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(Benedick (1998)). Thus, although there is a di¤erence in scale, the events surrounding the
Montreal Protocol may be taken as a precedent for the potential of such a mechanism.
The point is that unilateral commitments induce innovation, by creating a market for
such innovations and in technologies that could lower the cost of switching to low carbon
economic activities across di¤erent locations4.
We build a formal model where we analyze the conditions under which learning re-
sults in global adoption of low carbon technology in nite time. In our model, countries
initially are unable to agree to a global agreement to cut emissions. Individuals within
a country learn about the cost of cutting emissions which decreases as the fraction of
individuals, globally, evolves over time. Under our assumptions, an individual decision to
cut emissions is irreversible. When countries make a collective decision to cut emissions
by majority voting (and under our assumptions, such a decision is irreversible), we show
that such learning in a network of strongly connected countries, provided it builds on
unilateral initiatives in at least two countries , will, over time, deliver a global switch to
4The scope of such positive externalities may, however, be limited by issues of technology transfer and
absorptive capacity across locales in the face of binding political and cultural constraints.
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low emissions.5
Importantly, we prove a possibility result i.e. establish, under a strong set of assump-
tions (explained and examined in greater detail in section 3 below) what could happen
and do not make any claims that the scenario studied in the model will necessarily happen
unless appropriate policy mechanisms are put in place.
Drawing on the results of the model, we discuss how policy design could also a¤ect
global learning by impacting both the structure, and strength, of interactions between
countries and underscore the goal of convergence to a global low emissions regime. Our
result suggests that key features a successful policy regime that builds on unilateral initia-
tives via global learning should include measures for developing a platform for exchange
of information and subsidized monitoring, strengthening spillovers across subnational ac-
tors in di¤erent countries as well as a new global IP regime involving subsidized, targeted
technology transfer of low carbon activities6.
5I.e. one where two countries (e.g. Norway and China), even if not directly linked, are always indirectly
linked to each other via an intermediary chain of other countries (Norway, US, Mexico, India, China).
6There are two further issues that are beyond the scope of the current paper and which open up
further issues relating to policy design: (i) the optimal mix of local and central level actions within each
country, (ii) the interaction of unilateral initaitives and global negotiations to cut emissions. These are
matters that we aim to address in future research.
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A specic policy document presented by the G77 and China in Copenhagen under
paragraph 11 of the Copenhagen Accords addresses similar issues. This proposal sets
out a fast-track process for the di¤usion of relevant technologies to either high emissions
areas or those places where adaptation is already becoming a critical concern. We critically
examine key features of this proposal in light of our formal results.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briey sets out some
examples of unilateral measures. Section 3 sets out the model under which global learning,
building on existing unilateral measures, leads to a low emissions global paradigm. Section
4 discusses the possible implications of this model for the post-Durban process going
forward, while the last section concludes.
2 How extensive are unilateral measures on emis-
sions mitigation?
In this section we provide some examples of unilateral measures which have been taken
worldwide towards climate change. In ongoing global negotiations, the major participant
countries have simultaneously adopted national action plans for combating climate change
which also involve extensive use of unilateral commitments.
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To some extent, these unilateral commitments are mechanisms for the implementation
of proposed multilateral commitments, but in other ways they are di¤erent. Thus, in the
EU, there is a commitment to a 20-20-20 program, which involves a 20% reduction in
emissions and 20% of energy to come from renewables by 2020. This is independent of
any subsequent multilateral commitments, though the EU has o¤ered to go further to
a 30% emissions reduction if other entities were to match. Similar initiatives can also
be found in the case of China, where there are extensive commitments to a 20% energy
consumption reduction relative to 2005 by 2020, a 45% reduction in carbon emissions
relative to GDP by 2020 and also a similar 20% commitment to renewable energy. These
forms of commitments, interestingly, also seem to involve deeper commitments by smaller
countries. One striking case is Norway, which has committed itself to become a zero
carbon economy by 2050.
These examples are national but seemingly go substantially beyond what countries
are jointly willing to commit to multilaterally. And beyond the national level, there
are also many further commitments also being made by sub-national and local levels by
governments, community based organizations, businesses, and even by individuals.
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At the state and inter-state levels of government in the US we see multi-state agree-
ments such as the Mid-West Greenhouse Gas Reduction accord, the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative, the Western Climate Initiative and the Western GovernorsAssociation 
Clean and Diversied Energy Initiative. Setting restrictions on CO2 emissions by specied
dates is the content of all of these save the Clean and Diversied Energy Initiative, which
sets a 30000 MW production goal by 2015 for renewable energy among member states
as well as more long term goals. These agreements are not restricted to the US. Several
Canadian provinces have also signed onto some of these agreements, Ontario and Alberta
being examples. Within Canada as well, there is a cap and trade plan being negotiated
between Ontario and Quebec, two of the top three emitting provinces. Individual state
e¤orts in North America have the common feature that nearly all states and provinces
have programs designed to improve energy e¢ ciency, although direct emissions reduction
e¤orts are the most common activity. Similar initiatives exist in Australia, India and
China.
It is also not unusual in Europe for individual cities to now have emissions reduction
targets by specied dates. These could involve community based programs such as free
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bicycle plans, as in Copenhagen, Denmark or watershed renewal programmes, as in rural
communities bordering major rain forests as in Mexico, and community information mon-
itoring schemes as in sophisticated software which tracks carbon from individual houses
based on lifestyle and energy use (the idea being that increased knowledge will change
peoples behavior).
City level emissions mitigation e¤orts tend to lend equal weight to adaptation and
mitigation, usually blending the two in proposed plans. In New York City for example,
a major initiative is underway to improve energy e¢ ciency and reduce emissions of all
sorts, including a 30% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. The focus is on replacing
older infrastructure with new and more energy e¢ cient technology which will also prepare
the way for any water, food, or natural disasters to be dealt with, and also to replace
existing cars with more fuel e¢ cient ones and to increase the number of trees and parks
within the city. Toronto, Canada has also engaged in energy e¢ ciency upgrading for
many of its buildings and infrastructure projects. Otherwise the plan of action is very
di¤erent, with Toronto seeming to prefer development of local sources of renewables over
the larger infrastructure upgrading projects and promoting green roofs heavily. Munich
12
in Germany has a plan very similar to Torontos, with the added nancial innovation
of weather derivatives regarding the weathers impact in generating renewable power in
order to help manage the risks involved7. Similarly, London, UK, has a plan that focuses
most heavily on energy e¢ ciency upgrading, with projects on renewables.
In China, Shanghai has invested 80 billion Yuan (11.6 billion USD) in environmental
protection projects. The city, which is near to sea level has increased plant and tree
coverage to help ward o¤ erosion as the threat of oods increases and is also intensely
focused on upgrading and installing infrastructure to ensure the citys water supply. The
plan also provides incentives for promoting green industries within and around the city
and also has a goal for decreasing the volume of vehicles on the roads by 65%.8
A common thread in these unilateral emissions reduction initiatives (direct and indi-
rect) is a focus on renewables, energy e¢ ciency upgrading and infrastructure renovation
at a city level within the global sphere. On the other hand, more so than at high levels
of government, a clear focus on adaptive measures is also interwoven into these policies.
7http://www.munichre.com/en/ts/innovation_and_insurance_trends/
windmills_against_climate_change/default.aspx
8http://en.chinagate.cn/development/environment/2008-12/15/content_16950071.htm
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Commitments are also made at a business level, with new businesses o¤ering what is
needed for other businesses, communities and individuals to "go green"9. Because of the
wider social/political commitment to emissions reduction, it becomes good business to
characterize products as emissions sensitive, contributing to signicant emissions reduc-
tions. Finally, similar actions can be taken at an individual level.
These unilateral actions being undertaken to combat climate change and reduce carbon
emissions around the world are both diverse and in constant ux. The examples given in
this paper are representative samples of the levels and types of unilateral actions occurring.
For the purpose of the discussion here, the key point is that they jointly create a pool of
experience with a range of possible measures which can spur global learning and further
mitigation. Unilateral measures and global learning can be the key to wider mitigation
to follow on.
9Recent estimates set the "green" industry worldwide at roughtly 360 billion USD, with
estimates that this could grow rapidly to 650-750 billion USD by late 2015. See
http://english.cw.com.tw/article.do?action=shpw&id=10399&o¤set=0.
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3 Unilateral Measures and Global Learning
In this section, we examine the conditions under which global learning, building on the
positive spillovers generated by unilateral actions within a strongly connected global net-
work of countries, delivers ever deepening emission cuts over time and convergence to a
low carbon world in nite time.
3.1 Rationale for unilateral measures
A number of the examples discussed in the preceding section make the point that it could
actually be in the self-interest10 of relevant economic actors to undertake unilateral mea-
sures that also result lower emissions. Nevertheless, the diversity of unilateral initiatives
reects a underlying heterogeneity of interests, beliefs, motivation at the level of countries,
regions and groups.
Certain forms of collective identity can be self-enforcing in that conditional on other
individuals accepting the same collective identity, it is in the self-interest of any one
individual not to deviate, a point emphasized by Olson (1971) in his work on collective
10Examples include adaptation to the local impacts of climate change, ensuring energy security, halting
the process of desertication, local development needs.
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action11. A di¤erent possibility is that the agent who cuts emissions obtains a "warm
glow" as discussed in the literature on philanthropy (see, for example, Andreoni, 2006)
from the act of cutting emissions.
Straightforwardly, an economic agent will unilaterally cut emissions if the perceived
private benet (whatever its source, for example signalling a certain collective identity
from "going green", or "warm glow") is greater than the cost of cutting emissions. Clearly,
the cost of cutting emissions could limit, at any one point of time, the size of the group
of individuals, within a given population, who would be willing to unilaterally undertake
costly emissions cuts. Although a national level commitment to emission cuts may not
emerge as the outcome of majority voting, unilateral measures may then exist at various
subnational levels.
11A related rationalization of unilateral initiatives lies in "rule utilitarianism" (Harsanyi (1977)) where
individuals act to conform to a specic rule given that some group of other individuals also conform to
the relevant rule. Unilateral measures in a given group can be rationalized if each individual in that
group nds its optimal to cut emissions given that all individuals in that group conform to the rule of
cutting emissions.
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3.2 A formal model of unilateral measures, global learning and
cumulative emission cuts
Before we present the formal model, it might help to have an example that would t the
scenario studied in the model. In the OECD, Europe and in rapidly growing developing
countries, a small set of key 3-4 industries (power generation foremost) account for over
50% of industrial emissions. Adoption of low emission technology standards in these key
industries within a small group of OECD countries will signicantly lower the costs of
adopting standards in other countries both within, and without, the OECD. Heal (1993)
argues that as one country undertakes even limited emission cuts it incurs a variety of
costs (e.g. R and D investments, retooling) that are "sunk" in nature. However, once
the new low carbon technology has been developed, it can be made available to another
country at a relatively lower cost. Moreover, given the larger market, there are greater
private incentives to innovate in both countries leading to deeper emission cuts within
the two countries and at some point, depending on the structure of spillovers between
countries, inducing emission cuts by a third country and so on. The general point is that
as one country cuts its emissions, the cost of cutting emissions for other countries may,
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as a function of the structure of spillovers between countries, fall as well thus making
emission cuts more worthwhile in these latter countries.
In the model, with discrete time intervals which go from t = 1; 2; :::;1, there are
n = 1; :::; N countries. Each country consists of a number of individuals (also referred to
as economic agents) of mass one. At t, etn;j 2 f0; 1g denotes the emissions of greenhouse
gases by individual j belonging to country n so that at any t; etn;j = 0 corresponds to
adopting low carbon activities while etn;j = 1 corresponds to persisting with high carbon
activities. Let tn denote the fraction of agents in country n who choose e
t
n;j = 0 in time
period t. Then, etn = (1   tn) is the total level of emissions in country n at time period
t. Let Et =
P
i e
t
n denote the level of global emissions at time t.
We model the preferences and behavior of individuals within a country as follows.
Assume that individual j in country n obtains a private benet from cutting emissions
bj 2 [0; B], B > 0 with individuals within a country uniformly distributed on the interval
[0; B]. Consistent with our earlier discussion, we interpret this private benet to the
individual from cutting emissions as derived from either group membership or a "warm
glow" or just the direct benet from successful local adaptation.
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In our model, the cost12 of cutting emissions in country n at time t is a function of
a weighted sum of the fraction of individuals t 1n0 who cut emissions all other countries
n0 in preceding time period t  1. The weight attached to country n0 is denoted by n;n0,
0  n;n0  1: n;n0 is a parameter that captures the spillover from country n0 to country
n. We assume that n;n = 1. So c
t
n = cn
 P
n0 n;n0
t 1
n0

denotes the cost of cutting
emissions to individual located in country n given that a proportion t 1n0 , n
0 = 1; 2; :::; N
of individuals in all countries have already cut emissions at t  1.
Next, we formally dene the network structure over countries as follows.
Denition 1. (Network Structure) We say that country n is connected to country n0
if n;n0 > 0. Dene a directed graph (network structure) over N where the vertices are
countries and the arc (n; n0) exists i¤ n is connected to n0. A path in a directed graph is
an ordered collection of arcs and vertices in which all vertices are distinct.
Some examples might help clarify the structure of connections between countries in a
global network:
12These costs could be nancial costs, lowering the relative costs in terms of the e¤ort or time sacriced
to do the greenthing i.e. making it easier in terms of the physical and cognitive e¤ort involved to do
the greenthing rather than the more carbon intensive equivalent action.
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1. All countries are linked to each other. In this case, the complete network, n;n0 > 0
for all n; n0 = 1; :::; N . Note that in this case no one country is pivotal in generating
spillovers.
2. There is a single country (say, country 1) which is pivotal. Country 1 has two
way links with all countries but no direct links exist between any other pair of countries.
Nevertheless, all countries are indirectly linked to each other are linked to each other as
there is a path between any two countries via country 1. Country 1 can be thought of
as a large OECD economy like the US. Formally, in this case, n;1 > 0, 1;n > 0 but
n;n0 = 0 for n 6= n0 whenever n0 6= 1. Note that n;1 6= 1;n: we allow for the possibility
that the strength of the spillover on a small country from the US cutting emissions could
be di¤erent from the converse.
3. There is a small group of countries (say countries 1; 2; 3; :::; K) that are pivotal. In
this case, each pivotal country is linked to another pivotal country. Countries that are not
pivotal can be divided intoK non-intersecting groups, one for each pivotal country so that
there is a two way link between country 1 and each country in the group corresponding to
country 1 and so on. Finally, no no pair of non-pivotal are directly linked although there
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is a path connecting any two countries via some subset of pivotal countries. Countries
in the G20 could be thought of being pivotal. Formally, consider a partition of the set
of countries N1; N2; :::; NK (each non-empty) such that nr;ns > 0, ns;nr > 0, for some
ns 2 Ns and some nr 2 Nr, r 6= s, r; s = 1; :::; K, ns;n0 > 0, n0;ns > 0 whenever ns,
n0 2 Ns but n0;n00 = 0 otherwise.
In each of the above examples, even if a pair of countries are not directly linked,
there is, nevertheless a path indirectly linking the two countries. The following denition
provides a formal denition of networks that satisfy this property:
Denition 2. (Strongly connected networks) The directed graph over countries is
strongly connected if for every pair of distinct vertices (n; n0) there exists a path connecting
n to n0 i.e. between any two countries n; n0, there is a chain of countries n0 = n; :::; nS = n0
with ns;ns 1 > 0, s = 1; :::; S: in this case, we say that countries are globally strongly
connected.
Given the global network structure over countries, the spillover to the costs of cutting
emissions in country n at time t by emission cutting activity elsewhere is the weighted sum
of the fraction of individuals who have cut emissions in the preceding period
P
n0 n;n0
t 1
n0 .
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Specically, both whether or not n;n0 is strictly positive and its magnitude for given pair
of countries n; n0 will be a consequence of the use of appropriate policy mechanisms that
build on positive technological spillovers across countries. Such a policy will leverage
on the impact of positive technological/institutional externalities to facilitate innovation,
technology transfer and adoption of low emission activities both within a country and
across countries. Subsidized targeted technology transfer may alter the participation
constraints of nations over time. How such a policy relates to existing initiatives will be
discussed in the following section.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: Countries 1; :::; N belong to a strongly connected global network.
Assumption 2: In each country n, cn (:) is a continuous strictly decreasing function
on [0; 1] and two boundary conditions: cn(0) < B and cn0(0) < B for at least two countries
n, n0 and cn(1) = 0 for all countries n = 1; :::; N . For later reference, we label a cost
function that satises assumption 2 as an admissible cost function.
Assumption 1 requires that the global network of countries remains strongly connected
over the duration of the learning process studied below i.e. countries commit to, and
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implement, policy mechanisms that ensure the structure and strength of links between
countries remains unaltered over time. This is, admittedly, a strong assumption and we
will discuss (in section 3.3. below) the robustness of our results to this assumption below.
In our model, individuals in each country n learn the cost of cutting emissions as the
fraction of individuals cutting emissions in other countries belonging to the global network
evolves over time. When the cost function is admissible, we are able to show that there is
a pair of countries where there will be an unilateral commitment by a group of individuals
to cut emissions, that such unilateral actions lowers, over time, the cost of adopting low
carbon activities for other individuals both within country n and other countries as well,
and further, if all individuals within a country are choosing to cut emissions then no
individual within the same country will deviate to the high carbon activity. Again, we
will discuss (in section 3.3 below) the robustness of our main result to the assumption
that c(:) is admissible.
We assume that an individual i in country n behaves myopically and will voluntarily
choose to cut emissions at time t whenever bj   cn
 P
n0 n;n0
t 1
n0
  0. When cn(:) is a
continuous, strictly decreasing function for each n, it straightforward to note that once
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an individual voluntarily chooses to cut emissions at time t, he or she will continue to
voluntarily cut emissions in all subsequent time periods i.e. if for some individual j in
country n, etn;j = 0 is the optimal action at some time t, then e
t0
n;j = 0 continues to be the
dominant action for all t0  t. Therefore, in our model, although an individual behaves
myopically, once the decision to cut emissions is made, it is irreversible. We note that
under our assumptions, it is globally e¢ cient to set etn;j = 0 for all individuals j and
countries n at each t.
In each country n at each t, individuals collectively decide, via majority voting, be-
tween two alternatives: (i) all individuals within the country switch to zero emission
activities, or (ii) only those individuals who voluntarily choose to do so switch to low
emission activities. Therefore, a country n will commit to cut emissions to zero in period
t i¤ tn  12 : we will discuss the robustness of our main result to this assumption below.
A straightforward consequence of the fact that each individuals decision to cut emissions
is irreversible is that a collective decision, via majority voting, by country n at time t to
cut emissions is also irreversible.
We will further assume that no country will collectively commit, via majority voting,
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to cut emissions in the initial time period i.e. 0  0n < 12 for all countries n. As no
country has a majority in favour of cutting emissions, a global agreement to cut emissions
in the initial time period will not materialize even though it is globally e¢ cient to do so.
The divergence between private payo¤s and global payo¤s in our model reects both the
wide-spread negative externalities (the medium term damage caused by global warming)
resulting from continued high emission activities and the myopic behavior of individuals.
Let gtn = fj : bj   ctn  0g denote the group of individuals in country n for whom it
becomes the myopically dominant action to cut emissions at time t within a nation n with
m (gtn) denote the corresponding mass
13. Dene the function
Gtn = Gn
 X
n0
n;n0
t 1
n
!
= m

j : bj   ctn  0
	
:
Thus, Gtn denotes the proportion of individuals in country n for whom it becomes a
myopically dominant action to cut emissions at t.
The evolution14 of tn within each country n over time is assumed to be, for t  2, by
13I.e. the measure of agents belonging to gtn.
14There is a large literature on learning in networks (see, for example, Jackson and Yariv (2007) for a
synthesis and Jackson and Yariv (2011) for a survey). While the model we study here shares a number
of common features with these other models, there are at least two key di¤erences: (i) in our setting,
learning occurs both within a node and other nodes (i.e. individuals within a country as well as across
countries), and (ii) the incentives for individuals to cut emissions within a node (country) at time t
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the system of di¤erence equations :
tn = min

t 1n + n
 
Gtn   t 1n

; 1
	
, n = 1; :::; N , (1)
where n, 0 < n  1, is a measure of inertia in learning within country n. Not all
individuals within country n who benet from switching actually do so- this could be
due to variety of factors such as habit formation, lack of awareness and information etc.
What is essential for our main result is that n > 0 although we will also show that
the magnitude of n will matter in determining the speed of convergence to a global low
carbon regime. Note that (1) is a system of di¤erence equations that cannot, in general,
be reduced to a collection of uncoupled di¤erence equations, one for each country n.
Will each country eventually be in a position to commit to cut emissions?
The following proposition states the conditions under which global learning, building
on unilateral actions within a pair of countries, delivers a switch to low emissions in nite
time:
Global Learning Result: Under assumptions 1 and 2, the learning dynamics de-
depends on the entire distribution of the fraction of individuals who cut emissions over all nodes and not
just on either the aggregate fraction (in the network as a whole) or the fraction in neighboring nodes.
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scribed by (1) has a unique, stable15 xed point (1; :::; 1). Further, as long as the collective
decision to cut emissions within each nation is made by majority voting, there exists t^n,
decreasing in n, n;n0, n; n
0 = 1; :::; N , such that country n will commit to cut emissions
for all t  t^n, with etn = (1  tn) for all t < t^n: a global agreement to cut emissions will
emerge at t^ = maxi t^n and remain in place in all subsequent time periods.
Proof. Under the assumption that, in each country n, the private benet bj from
choosing etn;j = 0 is uniformly distributed over [0; B] and the assumption that c(:) is
a continuous, decreasing function, it follows that the map G = fGn(x) : n = 1; :::; Ng,
G : [0; 1]N ! [0; 1]N , is continuous and increasing on [0; 1]N as is the learning dynamics
described by (1). Further, by construction Gn (x) = 1 for all x  1, n = 1; :::; N .
Therefore, the vector (1; :::; 1) is always a xed-point of G = fGn(x) : n = 1; :::; Ng and
hence, of the learning dynamics described by (1).
Under our assumptions, there are at least two countries n, n0 with 0n > 0 and 
0
n0 >
0 and as countries are globally strongly connected, for each country k, it follows that
15Under our assumptions, there are at least two countries n, n0 with 0n > 0 and 
0
n0 > 0. Therefore, the
global stability of the xed point (1; :::; 1) under the learning dynamics (1) requires that limt!1 tn = 1
for all 0n  0 (with strict inequality for at least two countries), n = 1; :::; N .
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Gtk = Gk
 P
n0 m;n0
0
n0

> 0k. Whenever 
t
n0 > 0, for some country n
0 at some t, as there
is a path connecting each country n to country k, k 6= n, there exists t0  t such that
Gtn = Gn
P
n0 n;n0
t0 1
n0

> t
0 1
n  0: t = t0 if tn > 0 and n;k > 0, otherwise t0 > t, t0 
t+ s where s is the minimum number of vertices (the minimum taken across all the paths
connecting n to k) between n and k. It follows that (1; :::; 1) is the only xed-point of G
and the learning dynamics described by (1). Consider ft : t  1g the sequence generated
by an iterated application of the RHS of (1). Then, Gtn = Gn
 P
n00 n;n0(1  ")

> 1  ",
0 < "  1, and by continuity of G, for each country n, supt tn = 1 and as ft : t  1g
is a component-wise increasing sequence, limt!1tn = 1 for all n = 1; :::; N : therefore,
(1; :::; 1) is stable under the learning dynamics (1).
Let t^n = inf

t : tn  12
	
. Therefore, for all t  t^n,  t^nn  12 and a global agreement
to cut emissions will emerge at t^ = maxn t^n and remain in place in all subsequent time
periods. As the RHS of (1) is increasing in n, n;n0 , n; n
0 2 N , for each country n, t^n is
decreasing in n, n;n0 n; n
0 2 N . 
The proof of our result is based on the idea that the fraction of individuals in each
country switching to the low carbon activity is a non-decreasing sequence over time be-
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cause the decision to cut emissions is irreversible. Furthermore, with admissible costs,
the fraction of individuals in each country making the switch to a low carbon activity is a
strictly increasing sequence over time because unilateral initiatives are undertaken in at
least two countries and the graph over countries is strongly connected. Therefore, there
can be no points where the process gets stuck until all individuals in each country has
switched to the low carbon activity.
The above result16 implies that as long as countries are globally strongly connected
and the cost function is admissible global learning will eventually occur and a majority
of voters in each country n will, in nite time, voluntary choose vote to commit to cut
emissions leading to a global agreement to cut emissions.
However, our result builds on strong assumptions. Next, we examine how our main
result is a¤ected when the underlying assumptions are relaxed.
16It is worth pointing out that the formal model we study is di¤erent, both in terms of motivation and
in terms of formulation, from the model of international environmental agreements developed by Barrett
(1994). Barrett presents a multi-country model in which agreements on international environmental
regulations are enforced through agreed trigger mechanisms. These involve joint agreement to increase
pollution (emissions) if any country deviates from its agreed level. Our model has no formal international
agreements and agents in our model behave myopically, Barretts model has no learning and doesnt
examine the impact of network structure on global mitigation e¤orts.
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3.3 Clarication of the Global Learning Result
This Global Learning Result suggests the possibility that, with su¢ ciently strong spillovers,
the unilateral adoption of climate change mitigation technologies at a local level by in-
dependent jurisdictions can result in a universal adoption of such technologies, and es-
tablishes that this can indeed happen under certain assumptions. However, we do not
establish that global learning will necessarily lead a low carbon world.
We examine the role played by the assumptions made by us below:
1. The collective decision to switch to a low emissions is made by majority
voting: A key feature of the model is that once at least 50% of a population switch to a
low emission technology then 100% of that population use that low emissions technology
for ever more. There are a number of very strong implicit assumptions here:
(i) It is assumed that a majority decision to adopt a technology is equivalent to 100%
use of that technology. But even if the majority of individuals in a country vote to
install, say, windfarms, it may not be feasible for the majority to force everyone in the
country to use that source of energy. Of course the use of dirty technology could be taxed
(or made very expensive by other measures) but this is a strong assumption: there is an
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elision between technology spillovers and behavioral spillovers implicit in this assumption.
However, it is worth noting that what is crucial for our result to go through is that there
exists a threshold !, 1
2
 ! < 1, so that when the proportion of individuals within
each country cutting emissions was greater than or equal to ! there would be a collective
switch to cutting emissions. Such a threshold could be thought of as a purely technological
threshold (i.e. the cost of cutting emissions drops discontinuously to zero for all individuals
in a country once the fraction choosing voluntarily to cut emissions exceeds a certain
percentage (which is likely to be higher than 50%). If no such threshold exists, then a
weaker form of our result would still go through: the learning dynamics described by (1)
would still converge to a low carbon world: however, the global switch will not occur in
nite time although it could still be very close.
(ii) Second, under the assumption that in each country n, cn (:) is a strictly decreasing
function on [0; 1], the switch to a low carbon world is irreversible. However, technologies
do get mothballed if the economic circumstances that make them viable/protable change.
The rst implication of our assumption on the cost function is that all learning within
and across countries is complementary so that G is increasing on [0; 1]N : all internal and
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external learning will cause and increasing proportion of individuals within a country to
cut emissions (or at least, any negative inuence will tend to be overridden by the positive
inuences). Provided there is a threshold !, 1
2
 ! < 1, so that when the proportion of
individuals within each country cutting emissions was greater than or equal to ! there
would be a collective switch to cutting emissions, it is straightforward to note the Global
Learning Result doesnt require that G to be increasing over the whole of [0; 1]N . What
is essential for the argument in this case is that any xed-point of G is greater than (in
the usual vector ordering) the vector f!; :::; !g which requires that G is increasing on
[0; !]N so that the global learning result is robust to scenarios where negative inuences
eventually dominate positive inuences when a su¢ ciently large fraction of individuals
within each country have already switched to cutting emissions.
(iii) Finally there is the assumption that governments can commit to future policies.
But even if a region elects a very green government one period, it may be that future
governments are far less green and may undo policy and so make a technology less viable.
Of course, anticipating this possibility, raises interesting questions about what factors
drive private decisions to adopt cleaner technologies whose protability might depend on
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policies chosen by governments far into the future.
The Global learning Result requires not only that all countries belong a globally
strongly connected network but also that the network structure remains unaltered over
the duration of the learning process. The costs and credibility of policy mechanisms (e.g.
tax policy) that could maintain the structure and the strength of links between countries
isnt modelled. Clearly our main result wouldnt hold if governments could alter policy
so that the links between countries could be severed so that network structure fails to be
strongly connected thereby interrupting the learning process. Although it falls outside
the scope of our formal model, if agents could anticipate such future changes in policies,
a number of issues relating to the factors that drive individual decisions to adopt low
emissions technologies would arise.
2. Countries are connected to each other in a globally connected network.
To understand the importance of the underlying network structure (the pattern of spillover
e¤ects across countries) in driving global learning to the point where countries commit to
switching to low emissions, it is useful to consider the polar opposite case, where nn0 = 0
for all n 6= n0: in this there are no cross-country spillovers and each country is isolated
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(there are no arcs between countries) and all learning occurs within each country. In this
case, the evolution of tn within each country n over time is described, for t  2, by the
equation:
tn = min

t 1n + n
 
Fn
 
t 1n
  t 1n  ; 1	 n = 1; :::; N (2)
where Fn (:) = Gn(:) on [0; 1]. Clearly, in this case, (2) is a system of di¤erence equations
that can be reduced to a collection of uncoupled di¤erence equations, one for each country
n each of which can be analyzed separately. In this case, will each country eventually be
in a position to commit to cut emissions? The answer in general is no: learning within
country n may never result in country n, as a whole, switching to low emissions17.
It is straightforward to construct examples where limt!1tn <
1
2
for most countries
when countries arent globally connected. Suppose 0 < 1 <
1
2
, n = n1 = 0, n 6= 1.
Then, no country other than country 1 moves away from 0 as country 1 is isolated (i.e.
17Let n = min f 2 [0; 1] : Fn () = g is smallest xed point of the map Fn : [0; 1] ! [0; 1]. n is
well-dened as 1 is always a xed point of Fn(:) and the set of xed-points of Fn(:) is closed subset
of a compact set and hence, compact. Let ftn; t  1g denote the sequence generated by an iterated
application of the RHS of (2) with 0n  0 and n  0n > 0. Clearly, if 0n = 0, country n never moves
away from 0. If 0n > 0, then by continuity of Fn(:), supt 
t
n = 

n and as ftn; t  1g is an increasing
sequence, limt!1tn = 

n. Thereforer, if 

n <
1
2 , there will be no collective switch in country n to
cutting emissions.
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not linked to any other country) and this is the only country where unilateral actions are
being undertaken. Clearly, other less extreme examples, along the above lines, can be
constructed.
3. Speed of convergence and the role of government intervention.
Although learning in the formal model is driven by technological spillovers generated
by unilateral initiatives, we do not suggest that governments should do nothing to reach
cooperative agreements because local action alone will be su¢ cient to achieve the desired
outcome. Our main result shows that the global adoption of a low carbon technology
could happen by a process of purely local action. Could learning be faster if there were
e¤orts to reach some kind of cooperative agreements wherever possible? For example,
suppose n = 12 and
P
n 
0
n  12 . Suppose nn0 = 12 for all countries n; n0. Then our
global learning result implies that eventually it would be the case that tn  12 for all
countries n whenever t  t^. Note that in this case, under the learning dynamics (1) it
is necessarily the case that t^ > 2 (i.e. global learning will take at least three (or more)
periods). However, if cooperative agreements between countries could ensure that n = 1
and nn0 = 1 for all countries n; n
0, then under the learning dynamics (1), it follows that
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tn  12 for all n for each t  2. This is clearly a best-case scenario, one where convergence
is immediate: t^ = t^n = 2. More generally, as for each country n, t^n is decreasing in n,
n;n0 , n; n
0 = 1; :::; N , policy interventions that increase the values of these variables (i.e.
reduce learning inertia within a country and strengthen spillover e¤ects across countries)
will increase the rate at which there is global convergence to a low emissions regime.
Further, if the government in a country anticipates that unilateral actions lower the
cost of switching to low emission activities for individuals in other countries, the govern-
ment could incentivise a majority of individuals could be in favour of cutting emissions
in that country18 thus speeding up the process of convergence to a global low carbon
regime. Countries that (a) create the largest spillover e¤ects, either directly or indirectly,
on global learning, (b) are pivotal (i.e. without whom global learning will be delayed sub-
stantially), and (c) are willing to bear the costs of being one of the rst to switch to low
emission activities, are more likely to act in anticipation of inducing an earlier switch to
low emission activities by other countries. Moreover, such behavior will be inuenced by
18A simillar result has been obtained in a model of farsighted network formation in Dutta, Ghosal and
Ray (2005). Chatterji and Ghosal (2009) also make a similar assumption in the context of a discussion
on climate change.
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the strength of the spillover in learning across countries. For example, if n = 1, nn0 = 1
for all countries n; n0, voters in country n could choose to cut emissions to zero (so that
1n = 1) anticipating that 
t
n0  12 for all n0 6= n, t  2.
In conclusion, while even when countries initially are unable to agree to a global agree-
ment to cut emissions, global learning could, over time, deliver a switch to low emissions
in a network of strongly connected countries. However, it is worth emphasizing that our
result, like all theoretical results, suggests a possibility and establishes what will happen
under a certain set of assumptions.
In the following section, we use this result to develop a policy proposal that explicitly
accounts for such a possibility.
4 Global learning, the role of technology and IP, and
a road to a low carbon economy
In this section, we appeal to the results of the model developed in the preceding section
to motivate key features of a global policy regime that encourages the emergence of a low
emissions regime by building on the positive externalities inherent in unilateral initiatives.
The central mechanism is a new Multilateral Climate Technology Fund. Its aim would be
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to promote learning and spillovers which anyway occur.
In practice, national unilateral measures almost inevitably interact with multilateral
negotiations and so a rst step is to recognize these in the design of negotiations. This
is evident in the Copenhagen Accord document, which enshrined unilateral reductions.
Many countries announced unilateral measures in the lead up to Copenhagen and, while
such commitments could be interpreted as a way of simply staking out bargaining posi-
tions, the argument we put forward is that, by including them in the Accord, it allows
the Accord to become a starting point for an e¤ective global climate change adapta-
tion/mitigation framework. By committing to specic unilateral measures in the Accord,
the issue is how can countries positively alter the incentives for other countries to commit
to new measures in essence hopefully propelling a snowballing like race to zero carbon
on a wide scale?
To begin with, there is the issue of who the participants in global negotiations should
be. Given that subnational groups are more likely to have the autonomy to commit re-
sources in initiating unilateral measures, an open question is whether subnational groups,
such as provinces, states, or territories, who can exercise such autonomy could be allowed
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to include their commitments directly in a global agreement post-Copenhagen.
Central to the model in the proceeding section is the idea of a global learning process,
in which technology and innovation gure prominently. An alteration to the way tech-
nology transfer works on a global scale has already been proposed under paragraph 11
of the Copenhagen Accords and would aid in fostering learning. This proposal, which
was presented by the G77 and China in Copenhagen, sets out a fast-track process for
the di¤usion of relevant technologies to either high emissions areas or those places where
adaptation is already becoming a critical concern. As set out, this was to be governed by
an Executive Body on Technology which would operate under the authority of the COP
and operate using a new fund called the Multilateral Climate Technology Fund, largely
nanced by Annex II countries but supplemented by Annex I contributions, with the
incentive being that contributions to the Fund would count towards a countrys multilat-
eral negotiation responsibilities19. The proposal sets out to accelerate the rate at which
research and development on such technologies is conducted and to nance it through
venture capital and aid in rapid commercialization and di¤usion. There is an inherent
19A key advantage of this is that the amount of funding provided is not dependent on the price of
carbon, allowing the ow of funds to be more stable than otherwise.
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selection bias in this, since the Executive Body is selecting the innovations to go forward
to commercialization, but this might be possibly minimized by the makeup of this group
and the oversight of COP.
A key issue arising that previously arose with the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, that is how to ensure "additionality". For example
in the CDM case, rms would delay adoption of cost-e¤ective low carbon technologies to
benet from CDM or use CDM to adopt technologies that they would have funded from
capital markets or internal funds in any case(Olsen (2007), Wara and Victor (2008)). And
so, missing in this proposal are what sort of conditions should be attached to payments
to ensure "additionality". In the case of carbon mitigation technologies these conditions
could be time bound carbon emission or carbon intensity targets, and this could be partic-
ularly useful in key sectors such as energy, infrastructure, transport and heavy industry.
The process described here may take time to play out so that the emission cuts required
to stabilize global temperatures may not be delivered quickly. We envisage a process of
technology di¤usion that involves chains of innovations with new inventions based on
other low carbon technologies. Such a process may require roughly 5-10 years to play out
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for each innovation, or more if the innovations become controversial in some way. Some
of these new technologies will not be compatible with high carbon technologies and entire
factories may need to be retooled (thus raising the adoption costs of the new technologies).
Although innovation and subsequent transfer of new technologies is essential, emissions
reduction may be achieved by ensuring the spread and adoption of existing low carbon
technologies within and across countries. For example, households and rms within high
income countries could be persuaded to insulate their houses or install solar panels by a
combination of subsidies (or low cost loans), and by the extension of carbon markets to
individual households and small rms/businesses.
To achieve the goal of ensuring that the pace of innovation in low carbon technologies
is rapid, such a policy would likely have to be supplemented by other measures. If there is
uncertainty over commitments to emission targets and carbon prices uctuate over time,
or are too low or if too many economic activities are excluded from emissions trading,
there may be little or no impact on the behavior of rms and households. This may
discourage innovation (costly investment in the production of new ideas) that lowers the
relative cost of low carbon activities in the rst place.
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A missing element in this proposal is how it would interact with the currently ex-
isting intellectual property rights regime. What could be involved is a new global IP
regime characterized by governments in countries developing publicly funded new tech-
nology that involves users in other countries at the development stage, paying a part (or
whole) of the royalties paid by users in other countries for privately funded technology,
joint ventures between relevant actors (either in the private and/or public sector) across
national boundaries and lowering the cost of local use (and adaptation) of proprietary
technologies by designing an appropriate international licensing system.
In order to qualify for funding under the proposed global IP regime countries would
have to adopt specic commitments i.e. specic time-bound quantity targets like initially
lowering carbon intensity followed by emission cuts, the adoption of low carbon technology
(carbon capture and storage, solar and wind energy etc.) in important sectors such as
energy, infrastructure, transport and industry. The funding of individual projects within
a qualifying country could be decentralized so that royalties paid by users for privately
funded technology originating elsewhere were refunded and the cost of local use (and
adaptation) of such proprietary technologies subsidized. A portion of the funding could
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be reserved for research and development.
Innovations of the type needed in the key sectors mentioned above typically have to
go through years, and sometimes decades, of testing and regulation approval before they
can become commercially available. If this generally remains the case under the proposed
Technology Mechanism, its e¤ectiveness in mitigating carbon and other emissions in a
timely manner may be questionable, and to a lesser extent, this is also true of technologies
related more towards adaptation.
While not included in the proposal as it stands, the strength and structure of the links
(positive spillovers) between countries in this process would be important in its success.
For example, the US and the EU would be especially important because of their central
role in the world economy and their generation of innovation and technology transfer.
Others such as China and India would be important because of the size of their populations
and potential for emissions mitigation. For example, existing "clean coal" power plants
and carbon capture technologies can be developed and further rened in the US and
EU with a subsequent transfer to China under the mechanism proposed for it to have
a signicant impact in cutting emissions. Other links may reect structural similarities,
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land use patterns, existing patterns of carbon consumption, and of key features. Such a
structure, if included in the proposal, would aid in the e¢ cient distribution of funds by
allowing them to be dispersed according to characteristics such as the degree of spillover
by type of technology and by targeting countries that have the greatest potential to
generate spillover e¤ects20. Such a policy regime could also involve platforms where
information relating to unilateral initiatives could be exchanged and is hence likely to
involve subsidized monitoring.
Identifying, quantifying and strengthening spillovers will be key to the success of the
proposed mechanism and could feasibly t into the mandate of Strategic Planning Com-
mittee within the proposed Executive Body on Technology. This could be essential, as
encouraging the type of technologies needed in generating positive spillovers across coun-
tries are both likely to be costly and trade-o¤s may become necessary.
In general, measures that reduce emissions inertia within a country and measures that
strengthen the positive spillover e¤ects across countries are both likely to be costly. With
20This would be due to specic characteristics such as size, inuence, technological and innovation
capabilities, the degree of similarity with other national economies such as location, patterns of land and
energy use, dominance of key sectors, neighborhood e¤ects etc.
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resource constraints, there is likely to be a trade-o¤ between the two such as subsidizing
measures that improve the energy e¢ ciency of domestic households or subsidizing low
carbon technologies that reduce emissions in energy generation. The latter may have a
higher potential to generate spillovers across countries while the former will have a bigger
impact on reducing inertia within a country.
If cross-country spillovers occur on the level this proposal would need in order to be
considered a success, an almost inevitable question arises of what this might do to trade
ows. If this mechanism is to be a central feature of global climate change adaptation
and mitigation e¤orts the implication is for a further integration between the trade and
climate change regimes. This would have a number of benets, not the least of which
being the private sector incentive to be active on the climate change issue through the
proliferation of innovations necessary for a global low carbon paradigm.
It also suggests an eventual enforcement mechanism in the form of trade sanctions
or increased protectionism (or even the threat of such) against free riders or those who
refuse to participate. Bundling trade and climate change negotiations together could en-
sure broader participation and compliance in climate change negotiations because the ow
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of immediate benets associated with emission cuts (the benets of lower trade barriers)
could alter incentives for countries to participate in global negotiations. However, a nec-
essary condition for such bundling to work is that the threat of increased protectionism
by low carbon nations be renegotiation proof, a condition (i.e. increased protectionist
tendencies) more likely to met by nations already undertaking unilateral initiatives as
demonstrated by discussion of carbon based border adjustments to address issues of leak-
age.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we discuss whether unilateral measures can act as an e¤ective engine for
reduction in carbon emissions and achieve the goal of limiting temperature rise to 2C.
Ultimately, this will depend on unilateral measuresrelative e¤ectiveness, their number,
and their ability to create the synergies necessary to reduce the cost for other economies
globally to follow suit and switch to low carbon via a process of global learning. For such
a process to be successful, the post- Durban process going forward should attempt to
build on both national and subnational e¤orts to promote the development and spread
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of e¤ective unilateral action and encourage implementation of policy that strengthens
the spillovers of such actions across nations, which is key to the social learning process
we have described. Key for this process will be changes to the e¤ective international
intellectual property rights regime of the sort described in paragraph 11 of the Accord.
A less restrictive regime is critical for allowing spillovers across nations to take place on
a time scale, that would be meaningful for dealing with climate change according to the
current science. Thus contrary to the popular view of the Copenhagen Accord being
empty and a papered over agreement, in the context of the model described here, the
Accord may have the potential to become a foundation for an e¤ective post-Kyoto global
climate change regime.
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